A Unified Model of Spatial Price Discrimination by Eleftheriou, Konstantinos & Michelacakis, Nickolas
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Unified Model of Spatial Price
Discrimination
Eleftheriou, Konstantinos and Michelacakis, Nickolas
University of Piraeus
19 June 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/98328/
MPRA Paper No. 98328, posted 26 Jan 2020 15:25 UTC
A Unied Model of Spatial Price Discrimination
Konstantinos Eleftheriou;y and Nickolas J. Michelacakis
Abstract
The welfare e¤ects of regulation are of crucial importance to policy makers. To
this end, we present a model of n rms with di¤erentiated costs competing in a linear
market within the framework of spatial price discrimination. We prove that the Nash
equilibrium locations of rms are always socially optimal irrespective of the number
of competitors, the distribution of consumers, rms cost heterogeneity, the level of
privatization and the number and/or the varieties of the produced goods. We also pro-
vide an algorithm on how to nd the unique Nash equilibrium in the case of uniformly
distributed consumers.
Keywords: Mixed oligopoly; Social optimality; Spatial competition; Di¤erentiated goods
JEL classication: L13; L32; L33; R32
1 Introduction
Individuals residing in di¤erent European countries buying the Wall Street Journal Europe,
are witnessing a form of market segmentation due to discriminatory pricing dependent on
geographical location. This pricing practice is called spatial price discrimination (Cabral,
2000). However, this is not the only market where this type of pricing is common. Spatial
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price discrimination manifests itself in markets in which rms are geographically di¤erenti-
ated1 such as the markets of cement and steel or markets of customer-tailored goods. The
wide application of this pricing strategy2 together with the fact that it is forbidden by some
countries when it cannot be justied on the grounds of transportation/delivery costs (e.g.,
Robinson-Patman Act, 1936 in the US),3 makes the investigation of spatial price discrimi-
nation of great interest for both academics and policy makers.
The main goal of the current paper is to examine the welfare properties of the equilibrium
in a market where operating rms exercise spatial price discrimination. To this purpose, we
develop an integrated model giving new insight into the structure of customer-specic pricing
markets. The existing literature adopts at least one of the following ve assumptions: (i)
the number of rms in the market does not exceed two (ii) all rms are privately owned (iii)
only one homogeneous good is traded (iv) consumers are uniformly distributed and (v) rms
have common marginal production costs. We relax all the above assumptions by assuming a
market with an arbitrary number of heterogeneous competitors, an arbitrary distribution of
consumers, an arbitrary level of privatization for each rm and an arbitrary number and/or
varieties of traded goods. Firm heterogeneity is reected by assuming di¤erent marginal
costs of production. It should be emphasized that this heterogeneity is rm-specic and not
product-specic (i.e., the marginal cost of production di¤ers across rms but remains the
same for all goods/varieties produced by the same rm). The e¤ect of the above mentioned
1Greenhut (1981) provides evidence that spatial price discrimination is apparent in cases where trans-
portation cost represents at least 5% of total costs.
2Such pricing strategy can also be apparent in cases where output is di¤erentiated according to an
ordered product characteristic (Schmalensee and Thisse, 1988) (e.g., the di¤erent departure time of airline
ights between two destinations).
3For a review about the history of the enforcement of competition law against spatial discriminatory
pricing, see Scherer and Ross (1980).
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relaxation on the properties of the equilibrium is not clear. For example, Cremer et al. (1991)
highlighted the importance of the number of competing rms on the welfare properties of
the equilibrium.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in many ways. We show that in
a model of spatial price discrimination with linear transportation costs, where the produced
goods have the same reservation price for the buyers, the market outcome will be socially op-
timal, and this result is independent of the number of rms in the market, the distribution of
consumers, rm heterogeneity regarding marginal production costs, the level of privatization
of each rm and the number and/or the varieties of the goods o¤ered by each competitor.
We further argue that when consumers are uniformly distributed, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium which does not depend on the distribution of the marginal production costs. We
also provide an algorithm for computing the Nash equilibrium locations in this case.
The driving force behind our welfare result is the same as in Lederer and Hurter (1986); a
rm can increase its prot by opting for a production location so that the market is serviced
with minimal total cost.4 However, in Lederer and Hurter (1986) the discussion is restricted
to only two exclusively privately owned rms o¤ering the same good leaving untouched
mixed markets with many competitors and multiple goods and the ensuing welfare questions.
Moreover, our proof is completely di¤erent to the one found in Lederer and Hurter (1986)
allowing for direct generalization.
Our ndings about the characterization of the equilibrium are also in line with Vogel
(2011). Vogel (2011) proves the existence of a unique equilibrium for an arbitrary number of
privately owned heterogeneous rms located in a circular market (with uniformly distributed
4This implies the alignment of the social and private optima.
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consumers) competing within the framework of spatial price discrimination bearing linear
transportation costs, regardless of the distribution of their marginal production costs. We
investigate the properties of the equilibrium, should it exist, when an arbitrary number of
heterogeneous rms with various degrees of privatization o¤ering multiple goods compete in
a linear market under spatial price discrimination. In line with Vogel (2011), we prove the
existence of a unique equilibrium when consumers are uniformly distributed. We succeed,
however, in establishing the social optimality of the Nash equilibrium in all cases.
Moreover, the fact that our model imposes no constraints on the level of privatization
extends our contribution to the theory of mixed oligopoly under spatial price discrimination.
The studies which are closest to ours are those of Heywood and Ye (2009a) and Heywood
and Ye (2009b). Heywood and Ye (2009a) assume a market with an arbitrary number of
homogeneous rms having binary ownership status (private or public) and focus on the role
of the public rm in the Stackelberg equilibrium where the leader is a private or a public
rm. They extend their model accounting for the existence of foreign rms in Heywood
and Ye (2009b). The aforementioned papers impose too many restrictions in their modeling
structure. Specically, the framework of Heywood and Ye (2009a) and Heywood and Ye
(2009b) imposes restrictions on the distribution of consumers, the degree of privatization
and the attributes/number of goods in the market. In addition, a fundamental restriction of
the aforementioned papers lies in the assumption of common marginal production costs.
Our paper is part of a wide literature on location analysis5 which examines the welfare
implications of spatial price discrimination; see, e.g., Greenhut and Ohta (1972), Holahan
(1975), Thisse and Vives (1988), Hamilton et al. (1989), Hamilton et al. (1991), MacLeod et
5For a comprehensive review of the location analysis literature, see ReVelle and Eiselt (2005).
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al. (1992), Claycombe (1996) and Braid (2008). Building on this literature, we make inroads
into the theory of mixed oligopoly when rms have di¤erentiated marginal production costs
and the market is characterized by perfectly inelastic demand, as in Lederer and Hurter
(1986).
The implications of our results can be summarized as follows: (i) A spatial price discrim-
inatory market can serve as a typical example of how a laissez-faire economy can lead to
social optimality,6 (ii) the social optimality of the equilibrium is independent of rm hetero-
geneity and (iii) the dependence of the equilibrium locations on the relative di¤erence of the
marginal production costs has important policy implications for government intervention.
In the example of subsection 4.2.1 the government can (pre)determine the locations of rms
through intervention on the marginal production costs (e.g., tax incentives and subsidies for
rms located in low-populated areas etc.) without a¤ecting social optimality.
Moreover, our results have important policy implications for the welfare e¤ects of the
recent privatization wave7 and the recent tendency of states to buy private shares to prevent
hostile bids. Specically, the private outcome will be socially optimal irrespective of the
degree of privatization in markets with inelastic demand (e.g., demand for gasoline in the
short-run) where rms exercise spatial price discrimination. However, it should be noted
that sequential decision making and vertically linked markets are not accounted for in our
framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the benchmark
6Anderson and Engers (1994) showed that in a spatial setting with inelastic demand there exists a
unique price-taking equilibrium. However, even in this case social optimality can be achieved only if rm
locations are regulated. In contrast, the social optimality of our results is independent from any regulatory
intervention.
7See the Privatization Barometer Report 2014/2015 for more information about privatization trends
(http://www.feem.it/userles/attach/2015112392244PB_Annual_Report_2014-2015.pdf).
5
model where an arbitrary number of privately owned rms o¤er a homogeneous good. The
market is represented by a unit interval with the consumers arbitrary distributed along
it. A three-stage game of complete information is played by rms and consumers. More
specically, in the rst stage rms simultaneously choose their locations. In the second stage,
after observing their competitors locations, rms engage in Bertrand competition à la Hoover
(1937) and Lerner and Singer (1937). In other words, rms set their prices simultaneously and
are allowed to price discriminate by charging a di¤erent price for di¤erent locations. Finally,
in stage three, consumers make their purchasing choices to clear the market. After presenting
our theoretical construct, we solve the game and characterize the Nash equilibrium. The case
of mixed oligopoly is presented in section 3. Section 4 generalizes the ndings of section 3 for
the case of multiple goods (or di¤erent varieties of the same good) and section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling the competition
We consider a market consisted of n private rms and a continuum of consumers distrib-
uted according to a continuous distribution density function g over the unit interval [0; 1]
representing a linear country. Let xi, i = 1; :::; n, denote the location of rm i in the interval
[0; 1] with 0  x1 < x2 < ::: < xn  1. All rms produce and sell the same homogeneous
good. Each consumer has perfectly inelastic demand buying one unit of the good from the
lowest price rm, providing that this price is lower or equal to her reservation price (i.e., the
maximum price that the consumers are willing to pay for the good), m > 0. The marginal
production cost of rm i is ci  0. Spatial price discrimination à la Hoover (1937) and Lerner
and Singer (1937) is assumed. Specically, the price charged for the good by the rm the
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consumer chooses to buy from, is equal to (or innitesimally less than) the delivered cost of
the remaining rms. Delivered costs are equal to the sum of transportation and production
costs. Let td(x2; x1) := t(jx2   x1j) evaluate the transportation cost between points x1 and
x2, where d denotes the shipped distance and t > 0 is the transport cost per unit of distance.
Firms are located such that td(xi+j; xi) > jci+j   cij (non-negative prot condition)
8 for any
j > 0 with i; i+ j 2 f1; :::; ng and ci+j, ci the corresponding marginal costs of rms i+ j and
i located at points xi+j and xi respectively. Consumers and rms engage in a three-stage
game of complete information. In stage one, rms simultaneously decide their location. Hav-
ing observed the location of their competitors, rms simultaneously choose delivered price
schedules in the second stage. In the nal stage, consumers take their purchasing decisions.
Let si;i+j denote the locations of the indi¤erent consumer with respect to rms i and
i + j. The following Lemma essentially determines the location of the indi¤erent consumer
relative to the locations of the rms; its proof is deferred for the Appendix.
Lemma 1. (i) xi < si;i+j < xi+j and (ii) if j1 < j2 then (a) si;i+j1 < si;i+j2 and (b) provided
j1 < j2 < j, si+j1;i+j < si+j2;i+j.
The aggregate delivered cost for all locations z of consumers who buy from any of the n
rms is equal to
T (x1; :::; xn) =
nX
i=1
Ti(x1; :::; xn); (1)
where
8In the opposite case if, td(xi+j ; xi)  jci+j   cij, the total sales of either rm i or rm i + j drop to
zero.
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Ti(x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0BB@
R x1
0
[td(x1; z) + c1]g(z)dz
+
R s1;2
x1
[td(z; x1) + c1]g(z)dz
1CCA for i = 1
0BB@
R xi
si 1;i
[td(xi; z) + ci]g(z)dz
+
R si;i+1
xi
[td(z; xi) + ci]g(z)dz
1CCA for 1 < i < n
0BB@
R xn
sn 1;n
[td(xn; z) + cn]g(z)dz
+
R 1
xn
[td(z; xn) + cn]g(z)dz
1CCA for i = n;
(2)
is the total delivered cost for those consumers buying from rm i. Using (2), we get
T (x1; :::; xn) =
R x1
0
[td(x1; z) + c1]g(z)dz +
R s1;2
x1
[td(z; x1) + c1]g(z)dz + :::
+
R xi 1
si 2;i 1
[td(xi 1; z) + ci 1]g(z)dz +
R si 1;i
xi 1
[td(z; xi 1) + ci 1]g(z)dz
+
R xi
si 1;i
[td(xi; z) + ci]g(z)dz +
R si;i+1
xi
[td(z; xi) + ci]g(z)dz
+
R xi+1
si;i+1
[td(xi+1; z) + ci+1]g(z)dz +
R si+1;i+2
xi+1
[td(z; xi+1) + ci+1]g(z)dz
+:::+
R xn
sn 1;n
[td(xn; z) + cn]g(z)dz +
R 1
xn
[td(z; xn) + cn]g(z)dz:
(3)
As dened in Lederer and Hurter (1986) the social cost is the total supply cost when
rms behave in a cooperative, cost minimizing manner. The socially optimal locations can be
derived by minimizing the social cost with respect to each location xi. In other words, social
welfare is dened as the total consumers willingness to pay less the aggregate transportation
and production costs.
Firm i is selling its product at a price matching (or which is innitesimally less than) the
delivery cost of its direct competitor which is the rm nearest to its location. The indi¤erent
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consumer between rms i and i+ 1, according to Lemma 1, is located at xi < si;i+1 < xi+1.
Hence, the market share of rm i, 1 < i < n, is [si 1;i; si;i+1]. The pricing strategy of rm i
is determined by the following Lemma whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. (i) si 1;i+1 2 (si 1;i; si;i+1) and (ii) the prices charged by rm i, 1 < i < n, are
td(z; xi 1) + ci 1 for z 2 [si 1;i; si 1;i+1] and td(xi+1; z) + ci+1 for z 2 [si 1;i+1; si;i+1].
The pricing strategy of rms 1 and n can be derived along similar lines.
Thus, the prot function of rm i is
i(x1; ::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
R x1
0
[td(x2; z) + c2   td(x1; z)  c1]g(z)dz
+
R s1;2
x1
[td(x2; z) + c2   td(z; x1)  c1]g(z)dz
if i = 1
R si 1;i+1
si 1;i
[td(z; xi 1) + ci 1   td(xi; z)  ci]g(z)dz
+
R si;i+1
si 1;i+1
[td(xi+1; z) + ci+1   td(z; xi)  ci]g(z)dz
if 1 < i < n
R xn
sn 1;n
[td(z; xn 1) + cn 1   td(xn; z)  cn]g(z)dz
+
R 1
xn
[td(z; xn 1) + cn 1   td(z; xn)  cn]g(z)dz
if i = n:
(4)
The next result relates the marginal aggregate delivered cost with respect to location i
to the the marginal prot of rm i and lies in the heart of what follows.
Proposition 1. The marginal aggregate delivered cost with respect to the location of rm i,
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i = 1; :::; n, is opposite to the marginal prot of rm i, i.e.
@T (x1; :::; xn)=@xi =  @i(x1; :::; xn)=@xi:
Proof. See Appendix
Following our discussion above, the socially optimal locations are derived by minimizing
(3) with respect to each rms location. Hence, the socially optimal locations satisfy the
system:
@T (x1; :::; xn)=@xi = 0, i = 1; :::; n: (5)
whereas Nash equilibrium locations satisfy
@i(x1; :::; xn)=@xi = 0, i = 1; :::; n: (6)
Proposition 1 ensures that the system of (5) and (6) are equivalent leading to
Proposition 2. In models of spatial price discrimination where rms o¤er the same good
to consumers having perfectly inelastic demands, the Nash equilibrium locations of rms are
socially optimal.
3 Mixed oligopoly
In our analysis so far, all rms are privately owned. Let us now assume that single rm
l, l = f1; :::; ng is partly privately owned and partly publicly owned in proportions al and
10
1  al (in other words al can be considered as the degree of privatization), respectively with
al 2 [0; 1]. In such a case, rm l will decide about its optimal location by maximizing the
weighted average of its own prots and social welfare with weights al and 1 al, respectively.
Social welfare is equal to the sum of the aggregate prots (the prot of all rms) and
consumers surplus. The consumers surplus is given by
CS(x1; :::; xn) =
nX
i=1
CSi(x1; :::; xn);
where CSi(x1; :::; xn) is the consumer surplus generated for the consumers buying from
rm i, therefore,
CSi(x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
R x1
0
[m  td(x2; z)  c2]g(z)dz
+
R s1;2
x1
[m  td(x2; z)  c2]g(z)dz
for i = 1
R si 1;i+1
si 1;i
[m  td(z; xi 1)  ci 1]g(z)dz
+
R si;i+1
si 1;i+1
[m  td(xi+1; z)  ci+1]g(z)dz
for 1 < i < n
R xn
sn 1;n
[m  td(z; xn 1)  cn 1]g(z)dz
+
R 1
xn
[m  td(z; xn 1)  cn 1]g(z)dz
for i = n:
Direct calculation proves
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Lemma 3. i(x1; :::; xn)+ CSi(x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
R s1;2
0
mg(z)dz   T1(x1; :::; xn)
for i = 1
R si;i+1
si 1;i
mg(z)dz   Ti(x1; :::; xn)
for 1 < i < n
R 1
sn 1;n
mg(z)dz   Tn(x1; :::; xn)
for i = n:
Summing up over all rms one gets the following Proposition which could be viewed as
the rst main result of this section.
Proposition 3.
nX
i=1
i(x1; :::; xn) + CS(x1; :::; xn) = m  T (x1; :::; xn)
Proof. Straightforward calculations.
The prot function of the partly publicly owned rm l when marginal costs of production
are di¤erent will be
l(x1; :::; xn) = l(x1; :::; xn)
+(1  al)
"P
i6=l
i(x1; :::; xn) + CS(x1; :::; xn)
#
;
(7)
where l would be the prot function of rm l if it was fully privately owned.
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Proposition 4. Nash equilibria remain socially optima regardless of the degree of privatiza-
tion of the individual rms l; 1  l  n and/or their marginal production costs.
Proof. Fix a random l; 1  l  n. Using Proposition 3 and (7), we get
l(x1; :::; xn) = l(x1; :::; xn) + (1  al) [m  T (x1; :::; xn)  l(x1; :::; xn)] :
From Proposition 1
@T=@xl =  @l=@xl ()  @T=@xl   @l=@xl = 0;
which implies that @ l=@xl = @l=@xl. Induction on i completes the proof.
4 Invariance under multiple goods
4.1 Private rms
We now assume the existence of L di¤erent goods or di¤erent varieties of the same good or
both. Let kj denote the number of rms producing good j, j = 1; :::; L with 1  kj  n.
Let T j denote the aggregate transportation cost related to the provision of good j and ji
the corresponding prot per consumer of rm i from selling good j with ji := 0 if good j
is not produced by rm i. The fraction of consumers buying product j is now denoted by
hj 2 (0; 1] with
LP
j=1
hj = 1; hence, there will be buyers for all available products. In the case
where good j is produced by only one rm, then this rm enjoys monopoly privileges and
charges a price equal to, or innitesimally smaller than, the reservation price mj, i.e. the
13
maximum price the consumer is willing to pay for good j. A fundamental assumption in
this multi-good setting is that m1 = ::: = mL = m (i.e., the reservation price of all goods
is identical).9 Let ~T denote the aggregate delivered cost for all products and ~i the total
prot of rm i for all products it produces.
Proposition 5. The marginal aggregate delivered cost with respect to the location of rm i
is opposite to the marginal prot of rm i, namely @ ~T=@xi =   @ ~i=@xi.
Proof. By denition ~T =
LP
j=1
hjT
j and ~i =
LP
j=1
hj
j
i . Applying Proposition 1 for every single
traded product j we get
@ ~T=@xi =
LX
j=1
hj@T
j=@xi =  
LX
j=1
hj@
j
i=@xi =  @
~i=@xi:
Theorem 1. In models of spatial price discrimination, where rms have di¤erent marginal
production costs, produce di¤erent combination of goods, transportation costs are linear,
consumers are arbitrary distributed along a linear city of unit length and have the same
reservation price for all goods, the Nash equilibrium locations of rms are socially optimal.
Proof. To derive the socially optimal locations we have to minimize ~T with respect to each
rms location. Hence, the socially optimal locations satisfy the following system of equa-
tions:
@ ~T=@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (8)
9It should be noted that this assumption is more realistic in the case of the di¤erent varieties of the same
good and less in the case of di¤erent goods.
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On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium locations are given by the solution of the following
system:
@ ~i=@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (9)
Because of Proposition 5, systems (8) and (9) are equivalent and hence they have the same
set of solutions.
4.2 Mixed oligopoly
Lets now turn to the case where some rm, say rm l is partly privately owned and partly
publicly owned. In consistency with the notation developed in section 3 and subsection 4.1,
let l =
LP
j=1
hj 
j
l where hj
jl be the prot of the partially privatized rm l from selling good
j and hj 2 (0; 1] be the fraction of consumers buy product j. It is understood that 
j
l = 0
if good j is not produced by rm l.
Theorem 2. The degree of privatization does not a¤ect the socially optimal Nash equilibrium
locations.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 4, we have that for every single product j
@ jl =@xl = @
j
l =@xl :
Therefore,
@ l=@xl =
LX
j=1
hj@ 
j
l =@xl =
LX
j=1
@jl =@xl = @
~i=@xi:
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The existence of the equilibrium is a¤ected by the distribution of consumers. Specically,
we prove:
Theorem 3. In a mixed oligopoly of n rms, with n  3, producing di¤erent combinations
of goods with di¤erentiated marginal production costs, uniformly distributed consumers and
linear transportation costs, there exists a unique socially optimal Nash equilibrium of locations
for any (c1; :::; cn) in the non bounded subset C, of the positive orthant R
n
+, dened by the
inequalities
(n  2)ci + (n  2)ci+1   2
nX
cj
j=1;j 6=i;i+1
< 1; (10)
2(n  1)c1   2
nX
j=2
cj < 1; (11)
and
  2
n 1X
j=1
cj + 2(n  1)cn < 1: (12)
for i = 1; :::; n. Further any two marginal cost vectors (c1; :::; cn) and (c
0
1; :::; c
0
n) in the subset
C, such that c0i = ci + u lead to the same equilibrium locations.
Proof. We prove Theorem 3 in the simplest possible setting that of private rms producing
only one common good assuming the per distance transportation cost, t, equal to one. The
general case for the mixed oligopoly with multiple goods and t 6= 1 can then be proved along
similar to the analysis above lines.
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According to Proposition 2, the optimal locations must satisfy the system
3x1  x2 =  c1 +c2
 x1 +2x2  x3 =  c1 +c3
 x2 +2x3  x4 =  c2 +c4
...
...
 xn 1 +3xn =  cn 1+cn+2
It is straightforward to check that the above system is row equivalent to
3x1  x2 =  c1+c2
5
3
x2  x3 =  
4
3
c1+
1
3
c2+c3
7
5
x3  x4 =  
4
5
c1 
4
5
c2+
3
5
c3+c4
...
...
4n
2n 1
xn =  
4
2n 1
c1 
4
2n 1
c2 ::: 
4
2n 1
cn 1+
4(n 1)
2n 1
cn+2
where the i-line 1 < i < n is given by
2i+ 1
2i  1
xi   xi+1 =  
4
2i  1
c1  
4
2i  1
c2   ::: 
4
2i  1
ci 1 +
2i  3
2i  1
ci + ci+1 :
Solving for xi we get
xi =
2i  1
2i+ 1
[xi+1 +
4
2i  1
(ci   c1) + :::+
4
2i  1
(ci   c)
+

2i  1
(ci   c+1) +
4  
2i  1
(ci+1   c+1)
+
4
2i  1
(ci+1   c+2) + :::+
4
2i  1
(ci+1   ci 1)];
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where 2i  3 = 4+ , 0 <  < 4.
Inherent to the discussion leading to Proposition 2 was the assumption that x1 < x2 <
::: < xn. It is a straightforward, albeit tedious, calculation to show that
xi < xi+1 () (n  2)ci + (n  2)ci+1   2
nX
cj
j=1;j 6=i;i+1
< 1 :
Further, we get
0 < x1 () 2(n  1)c1   2
nX
j=2
cj < 1
and
xn < 1()  2
n 1X
j=1
cj + 2(n  1)cn < 1 :
To prove that the domain, C, dened by the above set of inequalities is not bounded it
su¢ces to consider all n-tuples (c1; :::; cn) with c1 = ::: = cn (homogeneous case) on the
positive part of the main diagonal of Rn+. For n = 2, the situation is considerably simpler
and is treated thoroughly in subsection 4.2.1.
4.2.1 Policy implications
To highlight the policy implications of our ndings in subsection 4.2, we present an applica-
tion for a duopoly with linear transportation costs. Let ci denote the marginal production
cost of rm i. There are three varieties of a di¤erentiated product o¤ered to consumers, U
andW from rm 1 and V andW from rm 2. Let also the fraction of consumers buying only
good U equal the fraction of consumers buying good V , with both set equal to e. Product
W is bought by a fraction b of consumers. Transportation costs are linear and equal to td,
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where t is a positive scalar and d is the distance shipped. The locations of rm 1 and 2 over
the interval [0; 1] are x1 and x2, respectively (without loss of generality x1 < x2). Keeping
the structure of the game and the rest of the notation as above, the prot functions of rms
1 and 2 when both are privately owned are:
~1 =
 
e(m  c1) 
et
2
[x21 + (1  x1)
2]

+
0BB@
R x1
0
b[t(x2   x1) + c2   c1]dz
+
R (x1+x22 + c2 c12t )
x1
b[t(x1 + x2   2z) + c2   c1]dz
1CCA ; (13)
~2 =
0BB@ e(m  c2)
  et
2
[x22 + (1  x2)
2]
1CCA
+
0BB@
R x2
(x1+x22 +
c2 c1
2t )
b[t(2z   x1   x2) + c1   c2]dz
+
R 1
x2
b[t(x2   x1) + c1   c2]dz
1CCA ;
(14)
with c2 c1
2t
 x2 x1
2
.10 The location s of the indi¤erent consumer for goodW is determined
by equating the two delivered costs in regard to the common good W : t(x2   s) + c2 =
t(s  x1) + c1 ) s =
x1+x2
2
+ c2 c1
2t
.
Having evaluated the integrals, (13) and (14) become
~1 = e(m  c1) 
et
2
[x21 + (1  x1)
2]
+bx1[t(x2   x1) + c2   c1]
+ b
4t
[t(x2   x1) + c2   c1]
2;
(13b)
10If c2 c1
2t
> x2 x1
2
, both rms are reduced to spatial-price discriminating monopolists where the common
good W is now provided only by rm 1. We consider this case trivial and focus only on the case where
c2 c1
2t
 x2 x1
2
.
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~2 = e(m  c2) 
et
2
[x22 + (1  x2)
2]
+b(1  x2)[t(x2   x1) + c1   c2]
+ b
4t
[t(x2   x1) + c1   c2]
2:
(14b)
Firm 1 chooses x1 to maximize (13b), and rm 2 chooses x2 to maximize (14b), leading
to the following Nash equilibrium locations
(x1; x2) =

1
2
  A+ !;
1
2
+ A+ !

; (15)
where ! = b(c2 c1)
2t(b+2e)
and A = b
4(b+e)
.
The total delivered cost will be equal to
~T = et
2
[x21 + (1  x1)
2] + et
2
[x22 + (1  x2)
2] + ec1 + ec2
+
R x1
0
b[t(x1   z) + c1]dz +
R (x1+x22 + c2 c12t )
x1
b[t(z   x1) + c1]dz

+
0BB@
R x2
(x1+x22 +
c2 c1
2t )
b[t(x2   z) + c2]dz
+
R 1
x2
b[t(z   x2) + c2]dz
1CCA :
(16)
Maximizing (16) with respect to x1 and x2 gives the socially optimal locations

1
2
  A+ !;
1
2
+ A+ !

: (17)
We now turn to the case where rm 2 is partly privately owned and partly publicly owned
in proportions a2 and 1  a2, respectively with a2 2 [0; 1]. In this case, the prots of rm 2
will be
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2 = e(m  c2) 
et
2
[x22 + (1  x2)
2]
+b(1  x2)[t(x2   x1) + c1   c2]
+ b
4t
[t(x2   x1) + c1   c2]
2 + (1  a2)v(x1; x2);
(18)
where
v(x1; x2) =
 
e(m  c1) 
et
2
[x21 + (1  x1)
2]

+
0BB@
R x1
0
b[t(x2   x1) + c2   c1]dz
+
R (x1+x22 + c2 c12t )
x1
b[t(x1 + x2   2z) + c2   c1]dz
1CCA
+
R (x1+x22 + c2 c12t )
0 b[m  t(x2   z)  c2]dz
+
R 1
(x1+x22 +
c2 c1
2t )
b[m  t(z   x1)  c1]dz
= (b+e)
2
[2tx1(1  x1) + 2m  t  2c1] :
(19)
It is straightforward to show that @v(x1; x2)=@x2 = 0 showing that the equilibrium re-
mains intact irrespective of the degree, a2, of privatization.
Furthermore, the distance between the optimal locations, x1 and x2, is independent of
marginal production costs and t and equals 2A. It follows that anybody who wishes to
inuence the location x1 of either rm 1, with x1 2 (0; 1=2),
11 or the location of rm 2, x2,
with x2 2 (1=2; 1), can do so by intervening on the marginal cost relative di¤erence, c2   c1.
For example, given an a priori X 2 (0; 1=2), it su¢ces to choose c1 < c2 in such a way that
c2   c1 =
2t(b+2e)
b
(X   1
2
+ A) for rm 1 to locate optimaly on the given X.
11x1 2 (0; 1=2) is implied by the fact that
c2 c1
2t
 x2 x1
2
(non-negative prot condition) and x2 x1 = 2A.
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5 Conclusion
We have proved that when rms exercise spatial price discrimination, the equilibrium out-
come is socially optimal and independent of the underlying assumptions on the number of
rms, rm heterogeneity, the distribution of consumers, the number or the varieties of the
provided goods and the degree of privatization. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis
is the rst attempt to present an holistic view of models of spatial price discrimination.
Moreover, our ndings verify the robustness of the laissez-faire doctrine and can be easily
applied to the case of vertically related markets (see Eleftheriou and Michelacakis, 2016).
It is also not hard to deduce the validity of our ndings for discontinued markets where
specic locations are ruled out. Possible extensions could investigate sequential decision
making, strategic delegation e¤ects and spatial two dimensional markets.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
By denition of si;i+j,
td(si;i+j; xi) + ci = td(xi+j; si;i+j) + ci+j:
If si;i+j 2 [0; xi] [ [xi+j; 1] then
td(xi+j; xi) = jci+j   cij ;
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a contradiction, thus, xi < si;i+j < xi+j which proves (i).
To prove (ii) (a) we argue by contradiction. From the proof of (i), we get that
td(si;i+j1 ; xi) + ci = td(xi+j1 ; si;i+j1) + ci+j1 (A.1)
td(si;i+j2 ; xi) + ci = td(xi+j2 ; si;i+j2) + ci+j2: (A.2)
If si;i+j1  si;i+j2, then
td(si;i+j2 ; xi) < td(si;i+j1 ; xi); (A.3)
and
td(xi+j2 ; si;i+j1) < td(xi+j2 ; si;i+j2): (A.4)
From (A.3)
td(si;i+j2 ; xi) + ci < td(si;i+j1 ; xi) + ci
(A.1), (A.2)
)
td(xi+j2 ; si;i+j2) + ci+j2 < td(xi+j1 ; si;i+j1) + ci+j1 : (A.5)
Hence
td(xi+j2 ; xi+j1) + td(xi+j1 ; si;i+j1) = td(xi+j2 ; si;i+j1)
(A.4)
< td(xi+j2 ; si;i+j2):
Thus
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td(xi+j2 ; xi+j1) < td(xi+j2 ; si;i+j2)  td(xi+j1 ; si;i+j1)
(A.5)
< ci+j1   ci+j2 ;
a contradiction. The proof of (ii) (b) follows similar lines.
Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1 si 1;i < si 1;i+1 and si 1;i+1 < si;i+1 which proves (i). For (ii) distinguish
between two cases; either si 1;j1 < :::: < si 1;jl 2 (si 1;i; si;i+1) with i + 1 = j1 < :::: < jl or
si 1;j1 < :::: < si 1;jl 2 (si 1;i; si;i+1) with j1 < :::: < jl = i + 1. We do the rst case. The
second case is done similarly. If the consumers location z 2 [si 1;i; si 1;i+1], the consumer
will buy from rm i, because si 1;i < z. Since z < si 1;i+1, rm i will charge a price
equal to the delivered cost of rm i   1, i.e. td(z; xi 1) + ci 1. If the consumers location
z 2 [si 1;i+1; si;i+1] then z 2 [si 1;jk ; si 1;jk+1] for some 1 < k < l. z > si 1;jk means that
the consumer buys cheaper from rm jk than from rm i  1 (z < si 1;jk+1 means that the
consumer buys cheaper from rm i   1 than from rm jk + 1). Since si 1;i+1 < si 1;jk < z
the consumer buys cheaper from rm i+ 1 than from rm i  1. Therefore, the price rm i
will charge is td(xi+1; z) + ci+1.
Proof of Proposition 1
We prove the Proposition for i, 1 < i < n; the border cases, for i = 1 and i = n, being
very similar.
@i(x1;:::;xn)
@xi
= @
@xi
hR si 1;i+1
si 1;i
[td(z; xi 1) + ci 1   td(xi; z)  ci]g(z)dz
i
+ @
@xi
hR si;i+1
si 1;i+1
[td(xi+1; z) + ci+1   td(z; xi)  ci]g(z)dz
i
:
(A.6)
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On the other hand
@T (x1;:::;xn)
@xi
= @
@xi
hR si 1;i
xi 1
[td(z; xi 1) + ci 1]g(z)dz
i
+ @
@xi
hR xi+1
si;i+1
[td(xi+1; z) + ci+1]g(z)dz
i
+ @
@xi
hR si 1;i+1
si 1;i
[td(xi; z) + ci]g(z)dz +
R si;i+1
si 1;i+1
[td(z; xi) + ci]g(z)dz
i
:
(A.7)
However, @
@xi
hR si 1;i+1
si 1;i
[td(z; xi 1) + ci 1]g(z)dz
i
=   @
@xi
hR si 1;i
xi 1
[td(z; xi 1) + ci 1]g(z)dz
i
and @
@xi
hR si;i+1
si 1;i+1
[td(xi+1; z) + ci+1]g(z)dz
i
=   @
@xi
hR xi+1
si;i+1
[td(xi+1; z) + ci+1]g(z)dz
i
.
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